The municipal elections of 2020 were quite unusual. First, because they occurred amidst a pandemic that has already killed over 173,000 Brazilians and caused a serious economic and social crisis. Second, because they took place under the far-right government of Jair Bolsonaro, who only months ago was threatening to stage a coup.
In this environment, voters went to the polls in elections which were conditioned in part by local particularities, such as the approval ratings of currently serving mayors. The considerable rise in the abstention rate can be explained by several reasons, such as a lack of interest in politics among part of the electorate, but the main reason was fear of contamination from the virus.
To make an overall assessment easier, we will look at the performance of the five main national political blocs: the traditional right, which is not part of the government’s base of support, and is led by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), the Democrats (DEM) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB); the far-right, the main wing of which is ‘Bolsonarismo’; those on the right that are part of the government’s support base, which includes the Progressives (PP), the Republicans and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB); the left, and in particular the Party of Socialism and Freedom (PSOL), the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB); and then the center-left, primarily the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). We then conclude by presenting some brief notes on the tasks for the left in the next period.
The traditional (non-Bolsonarista) right won
The right-wing parties that are not part of the current government’s base of support – such as the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), the Democrats (DEM), and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) – won in 15 capital cities, including a majority of the most important ones: São Paulo (PSDB), Rio de Janeiro (DEM), Belo Horizonte (Social Democratic Party, PSD), Salvador (DEM), Curitiba (DEM) and Porto Alegre (MDB).
The results achieved by the Democrats (DEM), which won in four capitals and are still disputing Macapá, are worth noting. Along with this, the party of the Chamber of Deputies president Rodrigo Maia has significantly expanded the electorate that it governs (from 7.9 million to 17.7 million people) and the budget revenue in the municipalities it administers (from R$32.5 billion (US$6.2 billion) to R$91 billion (US$17.4 billion)). The Democrats won in ten of the country’s hundred most populous municipalities.
For its part, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) fell in terms of the number of municipalities it governs (from 785 to 520), the electorate it governs (from 34.6 million to 24.8 million people), and the budget revenue it administers (from R$183.2 billion (US$35.1 billion) to R$155.1 billion (US$29.7 billion)). Nevertheless, the PSDB still controls higher portions of the electorate and budget revenue than any other party. The party of João Dória also obtained a significant result in the state of São Paulo, winning in the capital and almost 200 municipalities, and winning in sixteen of the country’s hundred largest municipalities.
The Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) won in five capitals, of which Porto Alegre is the most important, and in eighteen of the hundred most populous cities. On the other hand, it fell in terms of the number of city halls (1035 to 784) and electorate governed (from 21 million to 18.9 million people).
In the context of a greater spread of votes among numerous parties, it can be seen that the traditional (non-Bolsonarista) right has gained strength for the national contest of 2022, and recovered a considerable part of the social base, especially within the middle class, that it lost to Bolsonaro in 2018.
Bolsonaro lost
Of the 63 candidates that Bolsonaro came out and publically supported (eighteen mayors and 44 councillors), only five mayors and eleven councillors were elected. In addition, only one of the original Bolsonaristas was elected in a capital city, Civil Police deputy (‘Delegado’) Lorenzo Pazolini in Vitória, the capital of the small southeastern state of Espírito Santo.
The ebb and flow of the far-right has become increasingly evident around the world. In Brazil, the rise of the far-right two years ago saw it obtain enormous victories in presidential, state and federal elections. The fact that Bolsonaro was unable to form his own party, which meant that far-right candidates were scattered across several party acronyms, is a considerable part of the reason why Bolsonaro has suffered such a reversal.
Also of note is the harsh defeat suffered by current Rio de Janeiro mayor and evangelical pastor Marcelo Crivella, who was supported by Bolsonaro, and only received 35% of the vote in the second round. Celso Russomano, another candidate sponsored by the president, only scored 10% in the city of São Paulo. Other Bolsonarista candidates in Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Florianópolis and Belo Horizonte also performed poorly.
Another important fact is that the Social Liberal Party (PSL) did not win in any of Brazil’s hundred most populous cities. This the same party that Bolsonaro used to his advantage in 2018, that played host to many far-right candidates, and controlled the second-largest slice of the Electoral Fund. The Republicans, a party controlled by the Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG) and with strong ties to Bolsonarismo (two of Bolsonaro’s three politician sons stood as Republican candidates), also lost out in terms of the proportion of the electorate it governs (falling from 7.1 million to 5.3 million people) and won in only three of Brazil’s hundred largest cities.
Bolsonaro’s political and electoral defeat was mitigated by the result of the right-wing parties that form part of the base of support for the federal government, the so-called governing “centrão” (parties of the center). This ruling bloc won six capitals: Cuiabá, Campo Grande, Manaus, Rio Branco, João Pessoa and São Luis.
In addition, some Bolsonarista candidates still managed to achieve good results, even if they were defeated. These include Federal Police (PF) deputy (“Delegado”) Eguchi in Belém, and Captain Wagner, leader of a 2011 mutiny of Military Police officers, in Fortaleza. It is worth noting that far-right candidates did win in some big cities, such as São Gonçalo in the state of Rio de Janeiro and Anápolis in the state of Goiás.
Another aspect that should be emphasized is the increasing rejection of Bolsonaro across the country over the last month, a reversal in the upward trend in his popularity that began in July. This heightened rejection was most intensely felt in the capital cities, and particularly in places such as Salvador, São Paulo, Porto Alegre and Recife.
Despite the advance made by the governing center parties, the main political conclusion here is that the Bolsonaro government and Bolsonarismo as a neo-fascist political-ideological force have been weakened politically.
The governing center parties come out ahead
The right-wing parties that are part of the Bolsonaro government’s support base have increased the number of municipalities they have conquered (especially in small municipalities), the portion of the electorate governed, and the municipal budgets they control. Nevertheless, this “centrão” is still behind the traditional (non-Bolsonarista) right-wing in all of these indicators.
This bloc won in six capital cities, although they are not the main capitals of each region. The highlights here are the growth experienced by the Progressives (PP) of Ciro Nogueira, and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) of Gilberto Kassab. In turn, the Republicans and Podemos (“We Can”) lost ground in terms of the electorate it governed and the budgets it controls. Their advance in the municipalities will see the bargaining power of the “centrão” increase within the government and in Congress.
The left makes a relative recovery. The PSOL is the standout
First of all, it is important to assess the contradictory results of the Workers’ Party (PT), the largest party of the Brazilian left. For the first time in its history, Lula’s party did not elect a mayor in any of Brazil’s 26 capital cities. The PT did win in four major cities, as opposed to only two in 2016, but it saw the number of city halls that it leads fall from 254 to 183, its lowest number in sixteen years. In terms of the total number of inhabitants governed by the PT in cities, there has been a slight increase: in 2016 there were 6.033 million, now there will be 6.045 million.
It can be concluded that the PT, despite the drop in the number of city halls that it won, still had a slightly better electoral result overall than it did in 2016. The party did contain the bloodletting of 2016, but its defeat in São Paulo and all capital cities are of qualitative importance. In other words, even with its somewhat improved electoral performance in medium and large cities, Lula’s party suffered a political defeat in these elections. As a result, the PT has come out relatively weakened within the left bloc. It is still the largest left-wing party, but it has lost much of the strength that it previously had.
The Party of Socialism and Freedom (PSOL) had the best result among the left: it won in Belém, capital of the northern state of Pará, with Edmilson Rodrigues; and it gained over 2 million votes (40%) in São Paulo, the country’s biggest city, and in the process has put forward a new major national political figure in Guilherme Boulos.
In addition, the PSOL strengthened its city hall presence in important capital cities such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, and increased its total number of elected councillors across the country by 50%. Also worth emphasizing is the fact that the party elected many black, women, LGBT and youth leaders, a demonstration of a real alignment with the vanguards of the most dynamic struggles.
Thus, the PSOL has made a leap within the ranks of the left and on the national political arena, and therefore assumes new responsibilities and challenges. It is worth remembering that the party’s result would have been even better if Marcelo Freixo had been a candidate in Rio de Janeiro.
On the other hand, the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) lost votes, city halls and councillors, but was compensated by Manuela d’Ávila making the second round in Porto Alegre. Taking all this into account, one can see a weakening of the party, which now faces the serious threat of not making it past the electoral threshold (which grants parties public funding and time on TV) in 2022. It is also worth noting the political defeat in São Luis of the group backed by Flávio Dino, the PCdoB governor of the state of Maranhão.
Taken as a whole, the left-wing bloc has strengthened politically. Despite the electoral defeats in the second round in thirteen cities, it went to the second round in five capitals and put Guilherme Boulos (PSOL), Manuela d’Ávila (PCdoB) and Marilia Campos (PT) on the national stage. In addition, it obtained a victory in Belém and won in four important cities – Contagem, Diadema, Juiz de Fora and Mauá. In 2016, the left made it to the second round in only three capitals, won in one capital (Rio Branco) and conquered only two of the hundred most populated cities.
Center-left (PDT and PSB) advances in the capitals of the Northeast
The bloc formed by the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) won in four capital cities, holding on to existing city halls in Recife and Fortaleza and winning new ones in Aracajú and Maceió. However, it did not perform well in the regions of the Southeast, South and North. In Rio de Janeiro, Marta Rocha (PDT) did not make it to the second round, and neither did Marcio França (PSB) in São Paulo.
Among Brazil’s hundred largest municipalities, the bloc led by Ciro Gomes scored eight victories, as opposed to the twelve of 2016. The PSB lost city halls and the number of people it governs fell from 11.7 to 6.9 million. The PDT maintained its number of city halls, but has dropped in terms of people governed from 8.4 to 7.8 million. Therefore, it is fair to say that, while the center-left did not advance nationally as Ciro Gomes had hoped, it did win important positions in the Northeast.
Challenges for the left in the next period
The country remains in a reactionary political situation, one marked by the bourgeois offensive against social and democratic rights. But there are signs of a positive shift in the political and social correlation of forces, with the weakening of the Bolsonaro Government and of Bolsonarismo as a political-ideological force.
At first glance, the old right (PSDB, DEM and MDB) is the main beneficiary of the attrition suffered by Bolsonaro, above all because it recovered support among the middle class in large urban centers. For its part, the left is starting to recover from the consecutive defeats of recent years. The Guilherme Boulos phenomenon in São Paulo (which had strong repercussions nationally), the election of Edmilson Rodrigues in Belém, and the fact that both Manuela d’Ávila and Marilia Campos made it to the second round in Porto Alegre and Recife respectively, are evidence of this.
The weakening of Bolsonarismo and the recent erosion of the federal government are encouraging signs for the political and social struggle. However, we must be careful: Bolsonaro still has a considerable support base. It is weakened but not yet defeated. This is a political task that is still unresolved.
2021: Fighting for our rights and ‘Fora Bolsonaro’ (Bolsonaro Out)
The municipal elections are now over. Before even talking about the distant presidential election of 2022, we must think about the class struggle in 2021. The pandemic has not yet been overcome, unemployment is at record highs, there is no respite from the inflation of food prices, and emergency aid will now end in December.
With this in mind, the first task is to organize the struggle of working people and the oppressed for their most pressing demands: employment, income, wages, education, health, housing and other rights, with an emphasis on the battle against racism, machismo, LGBTphobia and the defense of the environment and indigenous peoples.
We must fight for the continuation and extension of emergency aid, for which an end to the budget spending ceiling is fundamental, as well as for public services and public servants to be valued and appreciated, and saying no to Administrative Reform.
With regard to the pandemic, we need to ensure that there is a plan for the safe vaccination of the entire population as soon as possible, starting with health professionals and people in high-risk groups. There also needs to be an expansion of tests and sanitary measures in workplaces and public transport. With the increase in infections and hospitalizations across the country, it is a crime for schools and universities to return to the classroom.
To strengthen the social struggle, it is fundamental that a United Front of political, union and social organizations of the Brazilian left be built, one that can confront the attacks and reforms of Bolsonaro and the neoliberal right. In this sense, the fighting unity of the People without Fear Front (Frente Povo Sem Medo, FPSM) and the Popular Brazil Front (Frente Brasil Popular, FBP), and of movements such as the feminist, black, LGBT, union, indigenous, leftist, and environmental movements, is essential.
The strategic objective for the coming year must be the defeat of Bolsonaro in the streets, before the 2022 elections. It is worth recalling that Trump only lost the U.S. elections in November because of the powerful anti-racist uprising that months earlier had mobilized tens of millions in the streets. The working class, the black population, the feminist and LGBT movements, the youth and other social sectors can, if they set themselves in motion, throw the neo-fascist out of power. With the strength of the streets, the left can take the lead in opposing Bolsonaro.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the importance of strengthening the PSOL as a new left-wing alternative. The campaign of Guilherme Boulos in São Paulo demonstrated that it is possible to touch the hearts and consciences of millions, and mobilize thousands of activists, with a policy and a program that is focused on the interests of working people and the oppressed, that connects with their social struggles, and does not rely on any alliance with the right.
This article is an English translation of “Bolsonaro se enfraquece, a direita avança e a esquerda levanta a cabeça”, Esquerda Online (EOL), 02/12/2020.
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